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Summary 
International  intellectual  history—the  intellectual  history  of  the 
international  and  an  internationalised  intellectual  history—has  recently 
emerged as one of the most fertile areas of research in the history of ideas. 
This article responds to eight essays inspired by my own contribution to 
this  field  in  Foundations  of  Modern  International  Thought  (2013).  It 
engages with their positive achievements regarding the recovery of other 
foundations for modern international thought: for example, in theology, 
historiography  and  gender  history.  It  addresses  some  of  the 
methodological problems arising from the search for foundations, notably 
anachronism,  presentism  and  diffusionism.  It  expands  on  others’ 
arguments about the international thought of Hobbes and Locke and the 
limits  of  cosmopolitanism.  Finally,  it  points  the  way  forward  for 
international  intellectual  history  as  a  collaborative,  interdisciplinary, 
transnational and transtemporal enterprise. 
 
Keywords:  International  thought;  international  intellectual  history; 
international  anarchy;  international  law;  natural  law;  positivism; 
cosmopolitanism;  presentism;  sovereignty;  states-system;  intervention; 
gender; historiography; theology; Hobbes; Locke; Staël. 
 
Intellectual history is a house of many mansions. Historians of philosophy encounter 
historians of the book. Contextualists jostle with conceptualists. Political theorists rub 
shoulders  with  literary  critics.  The  history  of  ideas  and  discourse  analysis;  
Ideengeschichte and Begriffsgeschichte; histoire des mentalités and cultural history: all 
these, and many more, inhabit the halls of intellectual history. The quarters have not 
always been luxurious: as Dominick LaCapra lamented in 1983, ‘History ranges from 
mansions  to  shacks,  thereby  paralleling  the  society  in  which  it  exists.  Today  social 
history tends to occupy many of the mansions and intellectual history a number of the 
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shacks’.
1 Thirty years later, the house is in much better shape and its residents’ spirits are 
high:  ‘Everyone  seems  to  be  getting  along  these  days’  and  ‘intellectual  history  is 
ascendant in the profession,’ Darrin McMahon and Samuel Moyn reported in 2014.
2 As 
the field gains confidence, it is becoming more extroverted. A leading symptom of its 
outward-looking exuberance is the international turn in intellectual history.
3 
As the various contributions to this symposium show, the international turn has 
swept  up  not  only  self-identified  intellectual  historians;  it  has  already  captivated 
philosophers,  political  theorists,  International  Relations  specialists  and  international 
historians.  It  is  particularly  gratifying  to  see  how  my  own  Foundations  of  Modern 
International Thought (FMIT) has inspired eight distinguished scholars to produce such a 
rich array of articles. I am immensely grateful to William Bain, Antony Black, David 
Boucher, Richard Devetak, Duncan Ivison, Paul Kelly, Terry Nardin and Glenda Sluga 
for engaging so generously with my book and for stretching the limits of international 
intellectual history. My warmest thanks also go to Knud Haakonssen for arranging the 
workshop at the National University of Singapore in April 2013 that led to this special 
issue and then for editing the papers for publication in History of European Ideas. The 
authors have probed deeply and widely and their work has exposed multiple foundations 
for modern international thought. They inspire hope that other foundations still remain to 
be uncovered.
4 
The  question  of  what  may  count  as  a  foundation  bedevils  any  genealogical 
inquiry. A foundation is evidently not the same as an origin—that ‘beginning which is 
also a cause,’ as Marc Bloch put it when diagnosing the ‘embryogenic obsession’ that 
had  spread  from  religious  exegetes  to  his  fellow  historians.
5 But  foundations  are  by 
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1 Dominick LaCapra, ‘To the Editor,’ American Historical Review, 88 (1983), 806. 
2 Darrin M. McMahon and Samuel Moyn, ‘Introduction: Interim Intellectual History,’ in 
McMahon  and  Moyn,  eds.,  Rethinking  Modern  European  Intellectual  History  (New 
York, 2014), 3; see also McMahon and Moyn, ‘The Fall and Rise of Intellectual History,’ 
The Chronicle of Higher Education (21 February 2014), B10–B12. 
3 David  Armitage,  ‘The  International  Turn  in  Intellectual  History,’  in  Armitage, 
Foundations  of  Modern  International  Thought  (Cambridge,  2013),  17–32;  also  in 
McMahon and Moyn, eds., Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History, 232–52. 
4 See also Lucian M. Ashworth, A History of International Thought: From the Origins of 
the Modern State to Academic International Relations (London, 2014). 
5 Marc Bloch, The Historian’s Craft, trans. Peter Putnam (New York, 1953), 30–31. 	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definition  fundamental.  They  mark  a  terminus  beyond  which  investigation  cannot  go 
further without the risk of infinite regress. It was to combat just that kind of regress that I 
specified in FMIT what I took to be some of the foundational features of peculiarly 
modern international thought: the separation of the domestic and the foreign; the primacy 
of  states  over  all  other  actors  in  the  external  realm,  including  individuals  and 
corporations; international law as the positive law of a system of states under conditions 
of  international  anarchy;  and  the  states-system  as  a  self-policing  club  with  its  own 
hierarchical  standards  of  admission  and  exclusion.
6 These  properties  could  not  be 
found—at least, not all found together—in the pre-modern period; many, if not all, have 
broken down in the age of so-called post-modernity. With these limits in mind, my own 
aim was not simply to dig down to the foundations in search of something solid but rather 
to unsettle some of the most basic mythologies of contemporary international thought.
7 If 
that  narrowed  the  range  of  historical  resources  available  for  present  purposes—for 
example, by expelling Thomas Hobbes from the canon of international theory—then that 
would at least release the past from the grip of our own concerns while allowing us to 
improvise our own conceptual resources.  
Antony  Black,  by  contrast,  has  attempted  to  expand  the  meaning  of  the 
international by digging far deeper than most in search of the foundations of international 
thought. He has even delved into what is conventionally called pre-history to discern in 
pre-political behaviour ‘two prevailing patterns of international thought: cosmopolitanism 
and realism,’ based respectively on human amity and enmity. Black then follows his 
themes through the Axial Age and onwards to early modernity. He finds racism and 
globalism in ancient Egypt, nationalism in Israel and ‘inter-state relations of a kind not 
too dissimilar to those of modern Europe’ among the Greek city-states, a set of relations 
which  in  turn  bred  ‘humanist  universalism  or  cosmopolitanism’  in  contrast  to  the 
particularist universalism of the Chinese world order.
 8 Black devotes more attention to 
Islam, with its traditions of an all-encompassing ummah and of jihad, that struggle of the 
soul  sometimes  externalised  as  holy  war,  than  he  does  to  South  Asia,  despite  the 
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6 Armitage, Foundations of Modern International Thought, 11. 
7 David  Armitage,  ‘Shaking  the  Foundations:  A  Reply  to  My  Critics,’  Contemporary 
Political Theory, 14 (2015). 
8 Antony Black, ‘Ancient and Non-Western International Thought,’ 000–00, above. 	 ﾠ 4 
importance of Kautilya’s international thought.
9 He ends his brisk survey by concluding 
that  ‘it  is  clear  that  international  thought  of a kind  did  exist  in  the  West  before  the 
seventeenth century, and that it did and still does exist outside the West in ancient and 
modern  times’  (000;  my  emphasis).  It  would  be  absurd  to  deny  that  there  was 
international  thought  ‘of  a  kind’  in  times  and  places  other  than  the  modern  West: 
everything depends on what is meant by ‘of a kind’. 
Black  is,  of  course,  not  alone  in  the  endeavour  to  locate  the  beginnings  of 
international thought in the classical past: the appropriation of Thucydides, the putative 
father of realism as well as the father of history, is only the best known and most resilient 
such  effort  of  retrospective  affirmation.
10 Much  of  his  account  rests  not  on  textual 
analysis  but  on  perceived  analogies  between  modern  ‘isms’  and  ancient  patterns  of 
thought. The positive upshot of this search for parallels is Black’s welcome reminder that 
Europe  (and  North  America)  still  need  to  be  provincialised,  temporally  as  well  as 
spatially,  in  all  our  intellectual  histories.
11 There  may  nevertheless  be  a  danger  in 
flattening  out  difference  in  order  to  make  the  past  more  serviceable  for  the  present. 
Family resemblances between ideas and forms of ‘international’ relations in the modern 
and pre-modern worlds can be found almost anywhere: Black does in fact discover them 
everywhere. His motivation becomes clear in his final paragraph, where he points to the 
advantages of Confucianism over Islam as a ‘world ideology,’ because the one promotes 
toleration while the other allegedly ‘erects new barriers’ between religions (000, 000). 
Like many of those who tunnel down into a classical past, Black is at heart (at least in 
this essay) not a historicist but a presentist. 
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9 C. H. Alexandrowicz, ‘Kautilyan Principles and the Law of Nations,’ British Year Book 
of International Law, 41 (1965–66), 301–20. 
10 Despite such attempts to stem the tide as Laurie M. Johnson Bagby, ‘The Use and 
Abuse of Thucydides in International Relations Theory,’ International Organization, 48 
(1994), 131–53, and David A. Welch, ‘Why International Relations Theorists Should 
Stop Reading Thucydides,’ Review of International Studies, 29 (2003), 301–19. 
11 Antony  Black,  ‘Decolonization  of  Concepts,’  Journal  of  Early  Modern  History,  1 
(1997),  55–69;  Martti  Koskenniemi,  ‘Histories  of  International  Law:  Dealing  with 
Eurocentrism,’ Rechtsgeschichte, 19 (2011), 152–76; John. M. Hobson, The Eurocentric 
Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760–2010 (Cambridge, 
2012); Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori, eds., Global Intellectual History (New York, 
2013). 	 ﾠ 5 
Presentism—‘the error of appropriating ideas from the past and mistaking them as 
our own,’ as William Bain puts it in his essay
12—has long been one of the cardinal sins 
for historians, especially intellectual historians. Yet an aversion to charges of presentism 
has often disabled us from admitting our reasons for studying past ideas and arguments at 
all. History in all its forms serves the present, even if that present is couched narrowly in 
terms of historiography’s ever-moving frontier. That does not mean we should assimilate 
the past entirely to the present or that we should cease our efforts to capture distance and 
difference. It does imply we should be more candid about explaining, even embracing, 
what one historian has recently called ‘motivational presentism’: that is, our reasons for 
why we study what we study in the here and now.
13 Searching for foundations can be 
genealogical in both the self-affirming sense (seeking an ancestry or pedigree) and in the 
Nietzschean  sense  of  deligitimation  through  the  exposure  of  compromised  origins.
14 
Black’s search for a usable past is more constructive than deconstructive. Despite my 
own  recent  advocacy  for  ‘transtemporal’  intellectual  history  over  the  longue durée,  I 
would  still  question  the  usefulness  of  his  transhistorical  categories  for  understanding 
international thought.
15 
No fundamental category has seemed more timeless to IR theorists than that of 
international  anarchy.  Anarchy  has  been  held  to  define  an  international  realm 
‘distinguished by the centrality of power, the prevalence of uncertainty, and the necessity 
of  self-help’  (in  William  Bain’s  words,  000),  distinct  from  the  domestic  sphere  of 
cooperation and solidarity under the protection of authority and law. As Kenneth Waltz 
noted, ‘The enduring anarchic character of international politics accounts for the striking 
sameness of the quality of international life through the millennia’.
16 Yet international 
anarchy  is  not  transhistorical:  it  was  invented  in  the  early  decades  of  the  twentieth 
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12  William  Bain,  ‘Thomas  Hobbes  as  a  Theorist  of  Anarchy:  A  Theological 
Interpretation,’ 000, above. 
13 Naomi Oreskes, ‘Why I Am a Presentist,’ Science in Context, 26 (2013), 595–609; 
Samuel Moyn, Human Rights and the Uses of History (London, 2014), xii–xiii. 
14 Raymond Geuss, ‘Nietzsche and Genealogy,’ in Geuss, Morality, Culture and History: 
Essays on German Philosophy (Cambridge, 1999), 1–28. 
15 David Armitage, ‘What’s the Big Idea? Intellectual History and the Longue Durée,’ 
History of European Ideas, 38 (2012), 493–507. 
16 Kenneth Waltz, The Theory of International Politics (New York, 1979), 102, quoted in 
Bain, ‘Thomas Hobbes as a Theorist of Anarchy,’ 000, above. 	 ﾠ 6 
century  by  publicists  like  G.  Lowes  Dickinson  and  Norman  Angell  to  diagnose  a 
contingent condition of inter-state instability. It was around the same time, and for similar 
reasons, that the adjective ‘Hobbesian’ came to denote the combination of authoritarian 
order within the state and unruly disorder in the relations between states.
17 In FMIT, I 
argued that this construction could not be substantiated from Hobbes’s own writings and 
that  ‘Hobbes  was  no  “Hobbesian”,’  at  least  as  far  as  his  international  thought  was 
concerned.
18 William Bain challenges this argument in his chapter by suggesting it might 
be possible to rescue Hobbes as a theorist of anarchy by attending more closely to his 
theology. 
Theological anarchy might seem to be a contradiction in terms but Bain closely 
tracks  Hobbes’s  conception  of  anarchy  back  to  his  voluntarist  conception  of  divine 
agency.
19 By stressing Hobbes’s account of the primacy of the divine will over the divine 
intellect, Bain argues for a novel view of his account of humans as ‘atomistic units, 
entirely unrelated, and therefore devoid of inherent relationships’ (000). To weld these 
atoms into something integrated, Bain argues, artifice is essential. Artifice is an attribute 
of the divine creator of the universe but it is also the property of peoples who organise 
themselves into sovereigns, those ‘artificial’ persons that can negotiate and trade, make 
treaties and forge alliances, with each other, even under conditions of mutual hostility 
and suspicion. Seen in this light, the imputed opposition of Hobbesian ‘realism’ and 
Grotian ‘rationalism’ proposed by some members of the English School of International 
Relations seems factitious and ungrounded in the structure of Hobbes’s own thought. 
Bain pushes this point home by noting the theological basis of Hobbes’s most distinctive 
and  most  frequently  lauded  contribution  to  the  history  of  international  thought,  his 
contention that ‘[t]he Law of Nations, and the Law of Nature, is the same thing,’ as he 
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17 G. Lowes Dickinson, The European Anarchy (London, 1916); Norman Angell, ‘The 
International  Anarchy,’  in  Leonard  Woolf,  ed.,  The Intelligent Man’s Way to Prevent 
War  (London,  1933),  19–67;  Brian  Schmidt,  The  Political  Discourse  of  Anarchy:  A 
Disciplinary History of International Relations (Albany, NY, 1998). 
18 Armitage, Foundations of Modern International Thought, 27; compare Noel Malcolm, 
‘Hobbes’s Theory of International Relations,’ in Malcolm, Aspects of Hobbes (Oxford, 
2002), 432–56. Stephen C. Neff, Justice Among Nations: A History of International Law 
(Cambridge, MA, 2014), 166–70, offers a recent restatement of the traditional view. 
19 The best study of Hobbes’s voluntarism remains unpublished: Noel Malcolm, ‘Thomas 
Hobbes and Voluntarist Theology’ (Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge, 1983). 	 ﾠ 7 
put it in Leviathan, echoing his earlier formulations along the same lines in The Elements 
of Law and De Cive.
20 If that is so—as Bain argues—and the law of nature is divine law, 
then the ius gentium must logically also derive from the laws of God. 
Any sphere in which divine law is supreme could hardly be anarchic in the sense 
of  uncontrolled  or  entirely  lawless.  Hobbesian  anarchy,  Bain  concludes,  has  a 
metaphysical grounding in a specific theology. A less ‘anarchic’ and more cooperative 
picture of humans’ propensity to work together and make alliances in the state of nature 
has already begun to emerge in recent literature on Hobbes, even without invoking a 
theological  foundation  for  his  account.
21 The  assimilation  of  Grotius  and  Hobbes  as 
representatives of a common ‘modern’ tradition of natural law has also been a signal 
achievement of the last generation of scholarship: no international intellectual historian 
would  now  argue  for  the  caricatural  opposition  between  the  two  thinkers  that 
underpinned accounts of distinct traditions of international thought.
22 The conflation of 
the laws of nature—and hence, the law of nations—with the laws of God may yet not be 
quite complete. As I noted in FMIT, the thirteenth law of nature that Hobbes enumerated 
in  De  Cive,  relating  to  free  passage  of  envoys  (or  what  we  would  call  diplomatic 
immunity),  had  no  equivalent  in  divine  law;  the  two  forms  of  law  were  thus  not 
homologous.
23 There may be limits, then, to the rootedness of Hobbes’s international 
thought in his theology but, in light of Bain’s wider argument, it would be hard to gainsay 
his conclusion that ‘[a]ny inquiry into the foundations of modern international thought’ 
would be ‘strangely incomplete insofar as it remain[ed] essentially silent on matters of 
religion’ (as Bain judges FMIT to be: 000). Theology is one of international thought’s 
foundations that is yet to be fully excavated, and not just from the works of Thomas 
Hobbes.
24 
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20 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Noel Malcolm, 3 vols. (Oxford, 2012), II, 552. 
21 For  example,  Kinch  Hoekstra,  ‘The  Natural  Condition  of  Mankind,’  in  Patricia 
Springborg, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes’s Leviathan (Cambridge, 2007), 
109–27. 
22 Notably  Richard  Tuck,  The  Rights  of  War  and  Peace:  Political  Thought  and 
International Order from Grotius to Kant (Oxford, 1999). 
23 Armitage, Foundations of Modern International Thought, 65. 
24 Compare Bain, ‘Vitoria: The Law of War, Saving the Innocent, and the Image of God,’ 
in Stefano Recchia and Jennifer M. Welsh, eds., Just and Unjust Military Intervention: 	 ﾠ 8 
If  I  did  overlook  any  relevant  theological  underpinnings  for  Hobbes’s 
international thought then Boucher’s essay gives me some comfort that I was in good 
company. Hobbes’s theology was evidently not an issue among the writers he identifies 
as the early historians of international and political thought. This was not because they 
were appalled by Hobbes’s reputation as a civil atheist nor because they stressed some 
other aspect of his thought: it was simply because ‘[n]either group considered Hobbes 
particularly important’.
 25 Boucher’s sample is admittedly narrow: it comprises only a 
handful of anglophone writers on the history of the law of nations and the foundations of 
political science. I doubt that his conclusions would be disproved if the search were 
widened to include the full range of relevant texts, in German and French as well as 
English. The first major histories of international law, from D. H. L. von Ompteda (1785) 
and G. F. von Martens (1796) to Henry Wheaton (1841) and Ernest Nys (1894), likewise 
ignored Hobbes. They took Grotius as the pivotal figure for the field, initially because 
their histories sprang from a tradition of the history of moral philosophy pivoting around 
Grotius, but also as the Dutchman later became sanctified as the ‘father’ of international 
law.
26 
The  history  of  Hobbes’s  reception  between  the  mid-eighteenth  and  the  early 
twentieth centuries is largely unwritten: Boucher’s brief survey is a valuable foray into 
one corner of the relevant literature.
27 It does seem to confirm that the early twentieth-
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Völkerrechts, 2 vols. (Regensburg, 1785); G. F. von Martens, Einleitung in das positive 
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Fassbender and Anne Peters, eds., The Oxford Handbook of the History of International 
Law (Oxford, 2013), 943–71. 
27 See  also  Camilla  Boisen  and  David  Boucher,  ‘Hobbes  and  the  Subjection  of 
International Relations to Law and Morality,’ in Raia Prokhovnik and Gabriella Slomp, 
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century  theorists  of  international  anarchy  misappropriated  Hobbes  rather  than  that 
Hobbes provided them with the inspiration to theorise the international realm as anarchic. 
International  thought  was  already  in  place  before  Hobbes  was  cemented  into  its 
foundations;  Hobbes  himself  was  not  fundamental  to  the  formation  of  international 
thought. In FMIT, I did note one important exception to that generalisation: the judgment, 
often repeated across the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by theorists within the 
natural law tradition from Pufendorf to Vattel, that Hobbes was an inspiring innovator for 
identifying the law of nations with the law of nature.
28 Boucher refers to many of the 
same sources but valuably adds to the negative side of the ledger Samuel Rachel’s 1676 
attack  on  Hobbes.  Rachel  distinguished  the  ius  gentium  commune  (common  to  all 
peoples)  from  the  ius  gentium  proprium  (among  those  bound  by  their  common 
agreements  with  each  other).
29 Later  positivists  would  also  make  this  move,  often  in 
tandem with an appeal to a standard of civilisation which bound the treating parties in 
mutual  recognition.  Rachel  placed  the  law  of  nature  above  the  law  of  nations  and 
attributed obligatory force to it due to its divine origin. His interpretation of Hobbes on 
the law of nations might cast some doubt on Bain’s theological reading, which appears at 
the very least contestable from within the broad tradition of natural jurisprudence itself. 
As Boucher shows, the gradual detachment of international law from the law of nature in 
the  nineteenth  century  left  Hobbes  exclusively  as  a  theorist  of  domestic  political 
thought—at  least  until  the  theorists  of  anarchy  began  to  invoke  him  as  a  talisman, 
decades before Martin Wight or Hedley Bull took him up as the alleged founder of a 
‘Hobbesian’ tradition of international thought. 
In contrast to Hobbes, John Locke has rarely appeared as the founder of a strain of 
international theory. Hedley Bull did compare international society to the Lockean state 
of nature—individualistic, yet operating under a modicum of sociability—but there have 
been  few  systematic  efforts  since  to  propose  a  ‘Lockean’  tradition  of  international 
thought.
30 This may be because scholars were looking in the wrong places in Locke’s 
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1977),  48;  Michael  W.  Doyle,  Ways  of  War  and  Peace:  Realism,  Liberalism,  and 
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oeuvre or because the right questions had not yet arrived on which his works could shed 
theoretical light. In the wake of decolonisation, the rise of postcolonial theory and the 
proliferation of movements for indigenous rights, Locke’s treatment of appropriation in 
the state of nature and the dispossession of native Americans seemed the most pressing 
element of his international thought to investigate and even to extirpate.
31 For much of 
the last generation, as Paul Kelly notes, the fifth chapter of Locke’s Second Treatise (‘Of 
Property’) was the focus of scholarly attention in this regard, as it is in two of the three 
chapters of FMIT dealing with Locke’s international thought.
32 Changing international 
conditions generate new objects of historical and theoretical attention. In the aftermath of 
the  Bosnian  War,  of  the  US-led  invasion  of  Iraq  and  of  more  recent  debates  on  the 
international community’s policies towards Libya and Syria, chapters XVI–XIX of the 
Second Treatise—on conquest, usurpation, tyranny and dissolution of government—have 
gained increased salience for what they might say about the ethics of intervention, the 
subject of Kelly’s essay.
33 
Kelly works towards an interpretation of Locke on the right to intervention that he 
wishes to reconcile with the international theory of the late Rawls to create a ‘Lockean 
international  theory  as  a  law  of  peoples’  (000).  He  shows  how  Locke  scales  up  an 
individual right of self-defence to become a people’s right to restore their ‘well-ordered 
political society’ (000; the echo of Rawls is conscious) after a tyrant has opened a state of 
internal war against them. Locke argues for a third-party right of intervention but not a 
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duty: only the aggrieved people have a right to self-defence. However, if others have a 
right to punish breaches of the law of nature and the people judge that they have been the 
victim of such offences by a tyrant, then they may presumably appeal not just to heaven 
for  the  justice  of  their  cause  but  to  the  aid  of  their  neighbours  or  other  external 
supporters. 
Locke’ conception of intervention was not the permissive one found in Vattel and 
his followers later in the eighteenth century, by which a third party may choose which 
side to support in a divided commonwealth.
34 It was a rather more restrictive argument 
designed to restore government as rapidly as possible after its dissolution, to distinguish 
intervention from conquest, to protect popular sovereignty and to maintain the integrity 
of ‘the several Communities [which have] settled the Bounds of their distinct Territories 
… by Compact and Agreement’ (2
nd Treatise, § 45). Even Locke’s theory of intervention 
needs to take his theory of property into account. The people’s property is vulnerable and 
must be protected from attack by a tyrant; likewise, the territorial integrity of states has to 
be maintained at all costs against conquest or usurpation. By this means, Locke could 
uphold the fundamental right of the individual and state sovereignty at the same time—a 
squaring of the circle later theories of intervention largely failed to achieve. 
The historical Locke supported and benefited from armed intervention. As is well 
known,  he  returned  to  England  from  his  exile  in  Holland  in  1688  with  William  of 
Orange’s fleet and in late 1689 published his Two Treatises of Government (drafted some 
years before) ‘to justifie to the World, the People of England’ and ‘to establish the Throne 
of our Great restorer, Our present King William’ (2
nd Treatise, ‘Preface’). A few months 
later, in 1690, he gave a clear, albeit telegraphic, justification for intervention in one of 
his fugitive writings. In an unpublished position paper on allegiance and the Revolution, 
Locke placed the highest value on ‘the alliance for the security of Christendom’ headed 
by William and urged loyalty to the king and the new regime to preserve ‘us against a 
more violent inundation of all sorts of misery’. As he argued, the ‘Prince of Orange, with 
an armed force, when nothing less could do, ventured himself to recover our oppressed 
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and sinking laws, liberties, and religion’ at a moment England had ‘a potent and vigilant 
enemy  at  our  doors’.
35 Put  this  way,  William’s  invasion  appeared  to  have  been  a 
humanitarian intervention to rescue the people of England from ‘misery’ as much as a 
military expedition to secure the balance of power against the ambitions of Louis XIV.  
Locke’s  argument  may  not  have  implied  a  duty  to  assist  on  the  part  of  any 
external power but it certainly permitted William to exercise his right on behalf of the 
beleaguered ‘People of England’. Whether that right could be generalised to any situation 
where a recognised people could prove their oppression cannot be inferred from Locke’s 
brief remarks. Nor could they give rise to a doctrine of pre-emptive intervention: there 
must be unimpeachable evidence of a ‘violent inundation of misery’ before there could 
be the possibility of a still more violent inundation. Locke’s reflections on charity—not 
just in the Essay on the Poor Law (1697) that Kelly mentions, but in other brief writings 
from the late 1670s to the mid-1690s—could not support a duty of care, at least at the 
international  level  demanded  of  humanitarian  intervention.
36 In  one  short  essay, 
‘Venditio’ (1695), Locke used the example of a Danzig merchant sending two ships of 
grain,  one  to  Ostend,  the  other  to  famine-stricken  Dunkirk.  Locke  argued  that  the 
merchant could rightly demand a price for his corn four times greater in Dunkirk than in 
Ostend because the market price would be higher where the need was greater. Profiting 
from the misfortune of others in this way was ‘no injustice against the common rule of 
traffic,’ Locke stated, if the merchant sought only the market price and did not demand 
more. He would offend ‘against the common rule of charity’ only if he left the famished 
Dunkirkers without subsistence; should any of them die, he would be guilty of murder.
37 
This implied no positive duty to preserve or rescue others in times of need. If generalised, 
the principle would set strict limits to any right of humanitarian intervention, even in 
cases of natural disaster. In this light, one might be sceptical that Locke could somehow 
become a Rawlsian international thinker if he were transported to the early twenty-first 
century. 
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36 For  example,  John  Locke,  ‘Atlantis’  (20  February  1679)  and  ‘Pacific  Christians’ 
(1688), in Locke, Political Essays, 257–58, 305–06. 
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But did Locke even possess a conception of the ‘international’? At first sight, 
Richard  Devetak’s  illuminating  investigation  into  the  historiographical  foundations  of 
modern international thought might suggest not. As Devetak convincingly argues, ‘the 
conception of the international as a world of states’ was just beginning to emerge in the 
late seventeenth century and only took on ‘a more stable appearance in the eighteenth 
century  as  historians  began  to  narrate  civil  histories  of  Europe  as  a  states-system’.
38 
Historians such as Samuel Pufendorf had first described states as being bound together by 
alliances,  treaties  and  the  balance  of  power,  and  distinguished  by  their  claims  to 
sovereignty under natural law;
39 it would be left to his successors, notably Voltaire in his 
Siècle de Louis XIV, David Hume in his History of England and William Robertson in the 
History  of  the  Reign  of  Charles  the  Fifth,  to  craft  accounts  of  European  history  as 
international  history.
40 Locke  was  notoriously  uninterested  in  mobilising  history  as  a 
foundation for his own political and international thought and he seems not to have read 
or owned any of Pufendorf’s histories of the states-system. Yet he had been a diplomatic 
secretary  in  the  1670s  and  was  offered  other  postings  abroad  before  and  after  the 
Glorious Revolution; his library also contained Machiavelli and Sarpi’s historical works, 
as well as some of the key contemporary literature on the threat of French ‘universal 
monarchy’ and the crisis of the Spanish Succession.
41 Locke was keenly aware that the 
foundations of international order in his own time were territorial, both among the states 
of  Europe  and  in  their  colonial  possessions  in  the  Americas.  His  hierarchy  of 
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international actors comprised ‘commonwealths’ and ‘peoples,’ not individuals. And he 
saw states operating in their own sphere of relations as if in a state of nature. We might 
then say that Locke conceived the international avant la lettre. 
Historiography was not fundamental to Locke’s conception of the international, 
but  Devetak  is  surely  correct  in  wanting  to  add  it  to  the  foundations  of  modern 
international thought. His essay contributes to an ongoing movement to pluralise and 
expand the sources for its study. Most work in the field so far—and here I would include 
much of FMIT—has sought to excavate reflections on the international from the canon of 
political theory. This has been in part a laudable attempt to read that canon against the 
grain—or, at least, counter to tradition—in search of arguments generally sidelined in the 
study of domestic political thought. It might also have been a challenge, open or implicit, 
to Martin Wight’s famous judgment that, by contrast with the canon of political theory, 
the resources for international theory exhibited both paucity and ‘intellectual and moral 
poverty’. Wight himself had based his judgment on the range of non-canonical sources 
that might be mined to supply material for the elaboration of international theory: among 
them, writings on peace from Erasmus and Sully to Saint-Pierre and Gargaz, theories of 
raison d’état, ‘the parerga of political philosophers’, and diplomatic speeches, memoirs 
and essays.
42 Yet even Wight did not imagine all the possible evidence for reconstructing 
international  thought  in  its  various  manifestations,  high,  middle  and  low.
43 These 
resources include the new genres created by the proliferation of the international in the 
seventeenth century and after: manuals for diplomats; collections of treaties (and the texts 
of the treaties themselves); the works of journalists and publicists such as Courtilz de 
Sandras, Rousset de Missy and Jean Dumont; and popular histories of the states-system 
like  John  Campbell’s  The  Present  State  of  Europe  (1750,  and  later  editions).
44 As 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
42 Martin Wight, ‘Why Is There No International Theory?,’ in Herbert Butterfield and 
Martin  Wight,  eds.,  Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International 
Politics (London, 1966), 19–20. 
43 Emma Rothschild, ‘Arcs of Ideas: International History and Intellectual History,’ in 
Gunilla  Budde,  Sebastian  Conrad  and  Oliver  Janz,  eds.,  Transnationale  Geschichte: 
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Devetak rightly says, ‘foundations of modern international thought were fashioned in 
diverse disciplinary and vernacular languages’ (000): without attention to those many 
languages, and the genres they informed, our view of the foundations will be necessarily 
incomplete. 
What,  then,  can  be  learned  by  examining  history-writing  as  a  source  for 
international thought? Devetak’s essay suggests three answers. First, we need to extend 
our chronological horizons in search of historiographical, rather than simply political, 
foundations. The works of Leonardo Bruni and Niccolò Machiavelli, among many other 
examples  of  early  sixteenth-century  politic  historiography,  turned  the  past  to  present 
purposes  in  the  context  of  glorifying  Italian  city-states  amid  conditions  of  interstate 
competition.
45 Yet Devetak is surely correct to see the full emergence of the international 
as post-dating the Renaissance, not least when historiographical analysis converged with 
natural jurisprudence in the works of Pufendorf and Vattel.
46 Second, we should be more 
attentive to the political contexts in which the international emerged. Devetak does not 
explicitly note the successive diplomatic settings for historical writing, but it can be no 
accident that the development of the international accelerated in moments of post-war 
settlement, in the wake of the Peace of Utrecht, after the Seven Years’ War and amid the 
post-Napoleonic reconstruction of what Arnold Heeren called ‘the Political System of 
Europe’.
47 Third, we are likely to come away with a narrow and possibly skewed vision 
of the foundations of modern international thought if we confine our attention to the 
tradition of political thought alone. Only by examining the full range of reflection on the 
international—narrative as well as normative, historical as well as theoretical— can it be 
possible to see how states became the primary and, by some accounts, the only legitimate 
actors in the international realm. 
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There are still dangers in relying on predominantly Western historiography for 
conceptions of the international. By definition, the histories Devetak selects for attention 
were pre-postcolonial: the progressivist enlightened narrative they propagated is exactly 
the story about European origins that postcolonial critics have sought to provincialise. 
The works of Voltaire, Hume and Smith could legitimately be called ‘cosmopolitan’ in 
their  European  setting,  but  cosmopolitan  is  not  the  same  as  universal.
48 Indeed,  as 
Duncan Ivison trenchantly reminds us, ‘every universalism has its limits,’ even those 
universalisms  we  might  instinctively  wish  to  approve  or  to  adopt.
49 Ivison’s  warning 
returns  us  to  the  question  of  foundations  as  origins.  Do  our  most  cherished  political 
concepts—human rights or cosmopolitanism, for example—always carry traces of their 
beginnings? Do foundations shape what will be erected upon them ever after? These 
questions have been pressing for students of liberalism who have repeatedly exposed 
liberalism’s complicity with empire in its founding phases, between the late seventeenth 
and  the  mid-nineteenth  centuries.  Ivison  broadens  the  focus  of  these  discussions  by 
‘giving injustice its due’ (000): that is, by using the claims of indigenous peoples who 
exist  ‘in-between  national  and  transnational  citizenship’  (000)  to  reveal  fundamental 
inequalities in the conceptions of cosmopolitan justice inherited from the Enlightenment 
and enshrined in the contemporary international order.
50 
The creation of the international as a category demanded exclusion as well as 
inclusion. By the late twentieth century, the international had become universal in the 
most basic sense that it was planetary in scale: few parts of the Earth’s surface, including 
the oceans, evaded its reach. Actors other than states gradually moved to the margins of 
the  global  stage.  Large  swathes  of  humanity—notably  the  stateless  and  indigenous 
peoples—lost international standing until they, or agencies acting on their behalf, began 
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50 See also Duncan Ivison, ‘The Nature of Rights and the History of Empire,’ in David 
Armitage, ed., British Political Thought in History, Literature and Theory, 1500–1800 
(Cambridge, 2006), 191–211; Ivison, ‘Emergent Cosmopolitanism: Indigenous Peoples 
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more recently to reclaim it from the all-enveloping world of states.
51 Ivison asks if our 
conceptions  of  cosmopolitanism  and  justice,  with  their  Kantian  grounding  in 
transcendental reason, can be adequate tools to recover the standing of the excluded. His 
analysis of cosmopolitanism into three component parts—moral, political and cultural—
suggests that they cannot, because cosmopolitanism’s ‘fundamental commitment to the 
equal moral worth and dignity of all human beings’ (000) is always in tension with its 
equally basic commitment to particular ways of being. Democratic legitimacy rests only 
in  peoples  constituted  as  sovereign  within  bounded  territories:  in  this  way,  the 
international order has determined the limits of the achievable, even of the thinkable. 
Critical possibilities might be imagined only if some Archimedean point could be found 
outside that order. 
Ivison’s subtle conceptual analysis acknowledges the weight of history. He does 
not advocate an escape from history—such an evasion would be impossible. He instead 
uses international intellectual history as the means to question current categories and to 
expose their limitations. Most pointedly, he indicates the effectiveness of other histories, 
especially  indigenous  experiences,  for  unsettling  the  foundations  of  the  present 
disposition  of  power  between  internal  and  external  authorities.  Before  the  nineteenth 
century, indigenous peoples were incorporated into the European ius gentium;
52 Ivison 
suggests that a reconsideration of the law of peoples is long overdue, to accommodate 
indigenous demands for dignity and recognition both domestically and internationally. 
This will be no easy task even in a world that is almost entirely postcolonial but still far 
from  post-imperial.  Imperial  histories  of  exclusion  and  hierarchy,  of  the  fastening  of 
territoriality and the constitution of ‘peoples,’ will be an enduring burden. With that in 
mind, Ivison’s chastened but forward-looking question is the right one: ‘What would the 
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structure of a conception of global justice be that took history and plurality seriously?’ 
(000). 
To answer that important question would be impossible without a consideration of 
the history of sovereignty, the main subject of Terry Nardin’s essay. ‘The main impact of 
the idea of the sovereign state on the international order,’ Nardin asserts, ‘was a kind of 
contraction’.
53 With  the  universal  diffusion  of  sovereignty,  non-state  entities  lost 
whatever vestiges of sovereignty—of autonomy among other autonomous entities—they 
may once have possessed. To put it in another idiom, the spread of sovereignty was a 
means of reducing complexity in the international system. In pre-modern international 
thought,  a  wide  variety  of  actors  could  assert  their  autonomy,  among  them  states, 
empires,  corporations,  religious  institutions,  indigenous  peoples  and  rights-bearing 
individuals or their proxies. As sovereignty spread, it gradually clarified what (and who) 
could or could not count as sovereign and hence what (or who) might be recognisable to 
other sovereigns as free, equal and independent. 
I  am  naturally  sympathetic  to  Nardin’s  historical  account  of  sovereignty’s 
diffusion.  He  may  be  right  that  ‘diffusion’  is  not  quite  so  overdetermined  word  as 
‘contagion,’ the term I took from Nicholas Greenwood Onuf to describe the globalisation 
of sovereignty.
54 Nonetheless, he and I agree that the best method for recovering the 
history of a practical concept like sovereignty is a middle road between reification and 
deconstruction, neither assuming sovereignty is portable, like a material object, nor that it 
is insubstantial, without any core meaning. And I think we would also concur that it is 
just  as  important  to  examine  why  and  where  sovereignty  did  not  diffuse,  as  part  of 
international  intellectual  history’s  effort  to  track  those  ideas  that  did  not  migrate  or 
‘globalise’.
55 
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Sovereignty  is  foundational  to  international  thought:  ‘not  only  a  topic  within 
international thought but also one that defines the subject’ (000), as Nardin notes. But 
what  are  the  foundations  of  international  sovereignty?  Nardin  sees  sovereignty  as 
essentially paradoxical in two ways. As a claim to supremacy over a specific territory, 
sovereignty demands a normative justification for freedom from interference by other 
sovereign claims. Justification in turn implies adjudication: if a sovereign judge must 
decide competing claims to sovereignty, then even the successful plaintiff will have to 
acknowledge a sovereign superior, who must acknowledge their own superior, and so on. 
Moreover, sovereignty implies grounding, and grounding implies founding. Unless the 
founding takes place entirely de novo, it will by definition be ‘illegitimate because it 
involves  overturning  an  already  established  system  of  authority’  (000).  This  problem 
strikes at the heart of the problem of creating new states in the international system.
56 The 
first major attempt to tackle it was in 1776, on the occasion of the U.S. Declaration of 
Independence. I have argued in FMIT and elsewhere that this moment became exemplary 
for future incidents of state-making across the globe, many of them accompanied by a 
document approximating to a declaration of independence addressed as an appeal to the 
community of states for recognition.
57 These declarations joined treaties, constitutions, 
declarations of rights and similar documents to form a web of significance which tightly 
wove together an international sphere founded on the diffuse basis of sovereignty. 
Tracing the diffusion of sovereignty is only one example of what I called in FMIT 
‘intellectual history on an international scale’.
58 I may have claimed excessive novelty for 
this enterprise in my book: as Nardin rightly points out, there were distinguished scholars 
working in this area in the 1950s and 1960s, some decades before it attained a separate 
identity as what Glenda Sluga hails as ‘the important, and at times revolutionary sub-
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field’  of  international  intellectual  history.
59 Pace  Nardin,  I  believe  the  work  of 
Alexandrowicz, Gulick, Kedourie, Hinsley, Holbraad and Schiffer could still prove my 
point that international historians and intellectual historians were estranged from each 
other until recently, because there is little evidence of exchange, even diffusion, between 
the two camps before the 1990s: as Cornelia Navari noted expectantly in 1995, ‘we still 
await  the  history  of  international  thought’.
60 What  has  changed  is  the  creation  of 
scholarly trading-zones, like this symposium, where historians of all stripes can join with 
political philosophers, International Relations theorists, international lawyers and others 
to debate matters of mutual interest. The results of these discussions are increasingly 
cosmopolitan—or, if you will, ‘transnational’ and ‘global’: as Nardin himself hopefully 
suggests, ‘the enterprise of international intellectual history is likely to become more 
inclusive as the study of ideas, thinkers, and texts in languages other than European ones, 
and by scholars in other parts of the world, increases’ (000). 
International intellectual history will only be able to claim to be inclusive when it 
encompasses the contributions of women as well as those by men. Glenda Sluga justly 
indicts FMIT of partiality when she notes that it treats only ‘the landmarks of a heavily 
subscribed Anglo-centric canon of political thinkers, completely male’ (000). I can make 
no plea in mitigation against this charge, except to remark meekly that because my aim 
was to subvert an existing (completely male) canon, I had to work within its confines. 
Yet that plea is patently insufficient. Genuinely unsettling the canon demands standing 
well outside its traditional limits, whether in terms of language, geography or, in this 
case, gender. The results so far have been promising but uneven. International intellectual 
history has already transformed the study of Mary Wollstonecraft by tracing the reception 
of her works and the proliferation of her image in Europe and the Americas.
61 In contrast, 
the  intellectual  history  of  the  international  lags  behind:  a  recent  collection  of 
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commentaries on classic twentieth-century texts of international relations includes only 
two  essays,  out  of  twenty-four,  on  works  by  women,  for  instance.
62 Gendering  the 
foundations  of  modern  international  thought  has  so  far  consumed  relatively  little 
scholarly energy. Sluga’s essay provides strong incentives to overcome that hesitation. 
An outstanding instance of women’s international thought is Germaine De Stäel, 
one  of  the  most  cosmopolitan  thinkers  of  the  early  nineteenth  century,  the  possible 
inventor  of  the  term  ‘liberalism,’  a  vigorous  promoter  of  ideas  without  borders,  ‘a 
perpetual motion machine who stirs up the salons,’ in Napoleon’s anxiously dismissive 
phrase.
63 Sluga persuasively shows how Staël contributed to the early nineteenth-century 
revolution in international norms at the time of the Congress of Vienna and how her 
internationalism intersected with her abolitionism, her promotion of freedom of the press 
and her commitment to religious toleration. Staël’s international impact derived as much 
from  her  novel  Corinne (1807)  as  it  did  from  her  posthumous  Considérations sur la 
Révolution française (1818), a fact that should alert intellectual historians to the place of 
fiction  and  other  literary  genres  in  shaping  the  foundations  of  modern  international 
thought.  Staël  was  exceptional  but  not  unusual  in  her  ability  to  deploy  transnational 
networks to disseminate her ideas and influence. Whether the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries marked the twilight of female internationalism before ‘the epoch that 
determined the gendered segregation of private and public spheres’ (000) remains to be 
proven. For the moment, the example of Staël shows the potential rewards of attending to 
women in the history of international thought. 
Women  have  long  been  at  the  forefront  of  both  the  history  of  international 
thought  and  of  the  international  turn  more  generally.  The  very  term  ‘international 
thought,’ meaning an historical corpus of reflection on the international, originated with 
the  Australian  classicist  Florence  Melian  Stawell,  whose  study  of  The  Growth  of 
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International Thought (1929) was the first survey of this body of literature in English and 
held  the  ring  for  decades.
64 Glenda  Sluga  was  among  the  first  to  introduce  ‘the 
international turn’ as a term of art into international history.
65 And in the last generation, 
Lauren  Benton,  Eileen  Hunt  Botting,  Annabel  Brett,  Patricia  Clavin,  Stella  Ghervas, 
Martine  van  Ittersum,  Beate  Jahn,  Renée  Jeffery,  Helen  Kinsella,  Lydia  Liu,  Karuna 
Mantena, Jeanne Morefield, Cornelia Navari, Karen O’Brien, Louiza Odysseos, Patricia 
Owens, Jennifer Pitts, Emma Rothschild, Jennifer Welsh and Lea Ypi—to name only 
some of the most prominent—have reshaped the history of international thought from 
Grotius (and before) to Gandhi (and beyond). All international intellectual historians, 
male and female, could benefit from a ‘gender turn’ in their field, as we learn more about 
the analogy between the domestic and the international with the private/public divide or 
how the idea of the state was sexed, for example. 
The articles assembled here demonstrate beyond doubt that the history of modern 
international thought cannot be the exclusive preserve of any group of scholars. More 
than  most  academic  enterprises,  international  intellectual  history  is  inherently 
interdisciplinary and collaborative. Its subject matter concerns scholars and students in 
law schools and schools of public policy as much as those in departments of History, 
Political Science or Philosophy. Its practitioners now span the globe and work on, as well 
as  in,  almost  every  part  of  the  world.  Their  studies  draw  on  methods  crafted  by 
contextualist historians, normative philosophers, theorists of International Relations and 
international lawyers. Each of these overlapping and reinforcing scholarly communities 
has its own interest in digging down to the foundations, even its own idea of what should 
be construed as fundamental. This wide array of foundations offers a solid base for future 
construction in international intellectual history. The challenging contributions to this 
symposium excite great confidence that, settled on such broad foundations, the house of 
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intellectual history will be increasingly expansive, inclusive and cosmopolitan after the 
international turn. 
 